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Abstract
We reveal the pervasiveness of the ﬁnance sector pay premium, across all OECD countries,
as well as all sub-sectors and occupations within the UKﬁnancial sector.Moreover, the UK
premium has continued to rise despite the ﬁnancial crisis. We show that earnings increase
faster with value added in certain sub-sectors of ﬁnance, compared to the general economy,
providing evidence of proﬁt-sharing in these sub-sectors. Other possible explanations, such
as workers with higher qualiﬁcations or better cognitive skills, or technological change and
differing job characteristics, can explain some of the ﬁnance sector pay premium, but are
not sufﬁcient on their own.
I. Introduction
Explaining wage growth in the UK ﬁnancial sector has remained a relatively under-
researched area in economics, despite the issue receiving a lot of attention in the European
media and the implementation of policies designed to affect it, such as the Capital Require-
ments Directive capping banker’s bonuses at a maximum of one year of salary from 2014.
Reed and Himmelweit (2012) loosely link the recent stagnation of UK wage growth to the
increased importance of ﬁnancial services in the aggregate proﬁt share. Also Bell andVan
Reenen (2010, 2013) document how high UK ﬁnancial sector salaries are an important
feature of growing wage inequality at the top end of the wage distribution. However, there
are few studies that seek to explain why the ﬁnancial sector wage premium has risen so
quickly and why it is now so high.
Consequently, the main aim of this paper is to explain the large, and increasing, wage
premium in the ﬁnancial sector.We do this by drawing upon existing theories and potential
explanations from the available literature on more general labour market inequality. For
any theory to be accepted as a possible explanation, it must be able to explain both the high
ﬁnance sector premium, and its further increase over time.
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The ﬁrst potential explanation that we consider is that of rent-sharing, whereby rents
created in the ﬁnance sector are sharedwith employees. In order to explain both the high and
the rising ﬁnance sector wage premium, such an explanation would need to offer a reason
why such rent-sharing is particularly and increasingly prevalent in the ﬁnance sector. Such
issues have been discussed in previous literature. For example, Bivens and Mishel (2013),
with reference to theUS but also relevant to theUK, suggest that the removal or reduction of
regulations on the ﬁnance sector, the implicit insurance provided by government bail-outs
of struggling ﬁnancial institutions, and the increasing complexity of ﬁnancial instruments
that allow ﬁnancial workers to hide risk from their investors, have all helped in the creation
and increasing extraction of rents in the ﬁnance sector.Aswell as this opportunity to engage
in rent-sharing, Bivens and Mishel (2013) also discuss a rising incentive to do so, due to
falling marginal tax rates on high incomes raising the beneﬁts from pursuing a larger share
of rents.As evidence for such a claim, the authors cite Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva (2012)
who show that higher pre-tax income in the top 1% of the distribution is associated with
lower marginal tax rates at the top, both over time in the US and across countries.
There are, however, other potential explanations of the high and rising ﬁnance sector
pay premium that we must also consider. It has been well documented that some countries,
most notably the US and UK, experienced substantial growth in general labour market
inequality over the last two or three decades.1 The forces that have increased inequality
generally may therefore be the same that have increased the ﬁnance-non-ﬁnance wage
differential speciﬁcally. One such general explanation that has received a lot of attention in
the literature is technological change. The basic idea is that the falling price of information
technology has led to the substitution of routine labour by technology capital. As routine
tasks tend to be performed in jobs situated in the middle of the job quality distribution,
economies with access to information technology have witnessed decreasing employment
shares in the middle of the earnings distribution. Consequently, employment has polarized
into high paid and low paid jobs and inequality has risen.2 This process has become
known as task-biased technological change (TBTC).3 Here routine tasks are thought to be
substitutes with new technology, whilst high-skill, analytical non-routine tasks are thought
to be complements. An analysis of skill intensity and task use in the ﬁnance sector would
therefore determine the relevance of this theory to explaining the high and rising ﬁnance
sector pay premium.
While the literature on inequality and TBTC spans a number of dimensions and now
also a number of countries, there have been relatively few studies that focus speciﬁcally
on the ﬁnancial sector. One notable exception is the study by Philippon and Reshef (2012)
who consider long-run variation in relative ﬁnance wages over the previous century. They
ﬁnd a U-shaped pattern, with ﬁnance sector wages being higher relative to average private
sector wages in the periods 1909–33 and again from 1980 onwards, while losing their
relatively high status in the interim period. They go on to consider relative education levels
and relative task complexity levels, and ﬁnd a similar U-shaped pattern for both time
1
See Acemoglu and Autor (2010) for a review of this literature.
2
See Katz and Murphy (1992), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) for the US and also Machin (2011) and Lindley
and Machin (2011) for Britain.
3
This concept was ﬁrst introduced by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) in their more reﬁned treatment of skill
biased technical change (SBTC). For a survey of the literature on SBTC see Katz and Autor (1999).
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series; skill-intensity and task complexity were relatively higher in the early and recent
periods, but not in the intervening period. The fact that relative wages, skill-intensity
and task complexity were just as high pre-1933 as post-1980 casts doubt on technology
being the underlying cause. Furthermore, after controlling for education they still ﬁnd
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial sector wage differentials, in the pre-1930s and post-1990s periods.
Instead, they focus on, and ﬁnd a key role for, the role of ﬁnancial regulation, and conclude
that ﬁnancial deregulation in the 1980s stimulated innovation (and therefore also prior
ﬁnancial regulation in the 1940s stunted innovation) explaining the rising wages and skill
intensity in the ﬁnance sector.
In terms of UK evidence, Bell and Van Reenen (2010) document increasing ‘extreme’
wage inequality by focussing on the income growth of the top 1% of British workers
between 1998 and 2008.They ﬁnd that 60% of the increase in this extreme wage inequality
can be attributed to the growth in bonuses paid to workers in the ﬁnancial sector. They
consider rent-sharing as a potential explanation, and in support show evidence that during
the 1995–2007 period, rents (measured by GVA per head) rose much more in ﬁnance
than in the economy as a whole. However, they go on to show that, although the ﬁnance
premium is observed at all points of the wage distribution, the increase in this premium has
occurred exclusively at the top end of the distribution, an argument against the widespread
distribution of rents across all ﬁnance workers. As an alternative, Bell and Van Reenen
suggest the existence of superstar effects,4 since they ﬁnd that even within the top 1%,
the largest gains have gone to those at the absolute top, the highest 0.02%, a phenomenon
which they ﬁnd to be more extreme in ﬁnance than in other sectors.
While such superstar effects may well be a main cause of the very high and rising
wages at the top end of the ﬁnance sector wage distribution, the focus in this paper is on
the slightly lower but still prevalent ﬁnance sector pay premium that we observe throughout
the wage distribution, and for which superstar effects cannot be the explanation. This idea
is therefore not explored any further in this paper. Instead, we investigate to what extent
ﬁnance workers are paid more because they are better qualiﬁed or have better cognitive
skills. We also look for evidence of TBTC in terms of any differences in the non-routine
task inputs of ﬁnance sector workers. In both cases, we will also investigate trends, to
determine whether the theory can explain the rising ﬁnance sector pay premium, as well
as its initial size.
Our paper shows that, despite the recent ﬁnancial crisis, theUKﬁnancial wage premium
has continued to rise. This premium is received by ﬁnance workers across all sub-sectors,
occupations and across the whole pay distribution. We show that the premium rises more
quickly with larger sectoral rents in certain sub-sectors of ﬁnance than in most other
areas of the economy, with a consequent suggestion of rent-sharing in these sub-sectors.
Considering alternative explanations, we ﬁnd that the UK ﬁnancial sector has become
more skill intensive and that ﬁnance sector workers had higher childhood mathematics and
reading test scores, on average, compared to non-ﬁnance sector workers. However, these
differences cannot explain all of the high level, or the increase in, ﬁnance sector wages.
We then go on to show that ﬁnance workers display higher levels of non-routine task
4
A ‘superstar effect’ is where small numbers of people dominate their particular ﬁeld and receive very large sums
of money, far above those only slightly below them in the ability distribution within their ﬁeld. See Rosen (1981) for
a discussion of superstar effects.
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inputs than those of non-ﬁnance workers, but we ﬁnd no evidence that this differential has
widened. Moreover, controlling for tasks performed, as well as for complex computer use,
qualiﬁcations and subject of degree, cannot fully explain the ﬁnance sector pay premium,
with signiﬁcant premiums for ﬁnance workers still remaining. The UK demonstrates the
second largest of these premiums in 2012, out of 21 OECD countries.
The principal contributions of the paper to the literature are (i) a more extensive doc-
umentation of the ﬁnance sector pay premium in the UK than previously available, with
evidence presented for the existence of the premium within detailed occupation codes for
the ﬁrst time, (ii) a focus on not only the high level of wages in the ﬁnance sector, but also
the increasing size of this premium, (iii) new evidence to support the rent-sharing theory,
showing the elasticity of wages with respect to value added in the ﬁnance sector relative to
other sectors, and (iv) a more extensive analysis of alternative explanations for the ﬁnance
pay premium.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section measures the UK ﬁnancial pay
differential.We document the size of the ﬁnance sector pay premium, show the importance
of including annual bonuses, and reveal how the premium varies across sub-sectors within
ﬁnance. Section III investigates whether rent-sharing is a plausible explanation of the
ﬁnance sector pay premium. Section IV investigates to what extent the UK ﬁnancial sector
has become more skill intensive, whilst section V considers whether ﬁnance workers have
higher cognitive skills on average, relative to non-ﬁnance workers and sectionVI considers
technological change and the role of job tasks. The ﬁnal section concludes.
II. Documenting the UK ﬁnancial sector pay premium
In order to measure the UK ﬁnancial pay differential and to see how it has evolved over
time, we start by using the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD). The NESPD
contains a sample of all working individuals, speciﬁcally those whose National Insurance
numbers end in a given pair of digits. The survey is distributed to and completed by ﬁrms
inApril each year. It produces close to a 1% sample of all employees in the UK and so the
sample is large relative to other UK surveys. One drawback of the NESPD is that it does not
collect information on the qualiﬁcations or skills of workers. From 1996, however, it did
start to collect the annual gross pay of workers, including incentive and bonus payments,
which makes it particularly attractive for measuring the ﬁnance pay premium.As was ﬁrst
identiﬁed by Bell andVan Reenen (2010), using weekly or monthly data to capture salaries
in the UK ﬁnancial sector leaves out bonus payments that tend to be paid just before the
end of the ﬁnancial year, for all but the small proportion who happen to be reporting for
the bonus-paying period.5
The ﬁnance sector is here deﬁned to include any business involved in ﬁnancial trans-
actions. It therefore includes, for example, the brokers and dealers in the ﬁnancial area of
London (‘the City’), central bankers, retail bank staff, and activities connected to insurance
and pension funds.A diverse range of activities can thus be found within the ﬁnance sector.
5
Although we can include such income-based annual bonuses, we do not observe capital income, which is likely
to be rising more quickly in the ﬁnance sector than elsewhere. To this extent, our results may understate the true
ﬁnance premium.
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TABLE 1
OLS and ﬁxed effects comparison of the ﬁnance pay differential 1996–2011
Log gross weekly pay Log annual gross pay
OLS Fixed effects OLS Fixed effects
Finance 0.413* 0.268* 0.478* 0.314*
(0.100) (0.003) (0.103) (0.004)
Including controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,628,372 1,628,372 1,628,372 1,628,372
R2 0.324 0.024 0.282 0.013
Notes:Table reports the coefﬁcients on aﬁnance sector dummyvariable, in separate
OLS and Fixed Effects equations. NESPD sample of men and women age 16–65.
Controls are gender, region, age and age squared.Year dummies are also included,
the OLS clusters on industry. Excluding the non-ﬁnance public sector. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *Signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
Our approach is to estimate Mincer style wage equations of the form
Yit =+Fit +Xit+ t + "it , (1)
where Yit is the real log wage of worker i at time t, and F is a dummy variable that equals
one if the worker is employed in the ﬁnance sector and zero otherwise at time t. Controls
for gender, age and its square, as well as region of residence, are included in the vector
X. t are year ﬁxed effects which we capture using year dummies, whilst "it is the error
term. We use two measures of wages. The ﬁrst is gross weekly wages which is likely to
largely exclude bonuses.We also use gross annual paywhichwill capture all labour income,
including bonuses. Bothmeasures are inﬂated into constant 2011 prices using the RPI.This
provides 1,628,372 observations from 1996 to 2011, excludingmissing values and workers
from the non-ﬁnance public sector. We keep public sector workers who work in banks in
our sample because of the nationalization of some banks during the ﬁnancial crisis (for
example the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2008). Including non-ﬁnance public sector workers
strengthens our results in that they are qualitatively the same as when excluded, but the
ﬁnancial premiums are everywhere larger. Of our 1,628,372 observations 125,277 (7.7%)
are ﬁnance sector workers. The real average weekly wage over the period is £492 and
the real average annual labour income is £25,296. In ﬁnance these are £709 and £42,202
respectively.
Table 1 provides the estimates of  in equation (1), clustering the standard errors on
one-digit industry. The ﬁrst column of results shows that on average, gross weekly wages
were around 39%6 higher in the ﬁnance sector relative to the rest of the private sector.
Using annual gross pay (which includes bonuses) results in a larger ﬁnance pay premium
of 48%.
6
Calculated as e −1.
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TABLE 2
Changes over time: OLS estimates of the log annual
pay ﬁnance differential 1996–2011
Finance sector
coefﬁcient N R2
1997–99 0.362* (0.113) 411,472 0.231
2000–02 0.455* (0.101) 304,158 0.313
2003–05 0.483* (0.102) 306,891 0.299
2006–08 0.553* (0.099) 281,496 0.275
2009–11 0.569* (0.095) 324,355 0.278
Notes: NESPD sample of men and women age 16–65. Con-
trols are gender, region, age and age squared.Year dummies
are also included. Excluding the non-ﬁnance public sector.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *Signiﬁcant at the 1%
signiﬁcance level.
Since the NESPD is a longitudinal data set, we are able to control for individual un-
observed heterogeneity by estimating a ﬁxed effects (FE) model, including the individual
ﬁxed effects, i:
Yit =+Fit +Xit+ t +i + "it. (2)
The FE speciﬁcation sweeps out any of the biases in theOLSweekly/annual wage equations
caused by correlations between the covariates, in particular the ﬁnance sector dummy, and
the time-invariant components of the error term. This is especially important here, given
we cannot control for the highest qualiﬁcations, which are ﬁxed over time for most adults
and so should largely be picked up by the ﬁxed effects.7 The FE results in the second and
fourth columns of results show that the ﬁnance sector premium falls relative to the OLS
estimates, as one would expect if there are unobservables that are positively correlated with
working in the ﬁnance sector and also receiving higher wages, though rather surprisingly,
it does not fall bymuch.Annual wages in the ﬁnance sector are still 37% higher on average,
relative to those for non-ﬁnance workers in the private sector, even after conditioning on
age, region and unobserved heterogeneity. In analysis not shown, the change in wages is
observed both for those who join and those who leave ﬁnance.
Table 2 shows changes over time in the OLS estimates of the ﬁnance sector annual pay
premium. The ﬁnancial pay premium has increased over time from 44% during 1997–99
to 77% during 2009–11. The differential shows no signs of declining, despite the start of
the recession in 2008.8
One factor not considered so far is that the occupations being performed in the
ﬁnance sector differ to those in the non-ﬁnance sectors. Conditioning on three-digit
occupations failed to fully explain these ﬁnance sector premiums, and demonstrated
7
Subsequent sections do introduce qualiﬁcations and skills, using alternative data sets.
8
Supplementary Table S1 shows a similar pattern over time using the FE speciﬁcation. The changes over time are
less pronounced, suggesting an increase over time in the upward bias caused by unobserved (to us) heterogeneity
in the OLS results, possibly due to the shake-up caused by the ﬁnancial crisis and the removal of observed (by the
employer) lower-ability employees.
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TABLE 3
OLS and ﬁxed effects estimate of the ﬁnance annual pay differential, among
individuals working in occupations most commonly found in both ﬁnance and
non-ﬁnance sectors
OLS Fixed effects
111 Corporate managers 0.384* (0.060) 0.263* (0.026)
113 Functional managers 0.323* (0.030) 0.196* (0.008)
114 Customer care manager 0.068† (0.027) 0.206* (0.026)
115 Financial and ofﬁce managers 0.204* (0.024) 0.173* (0.010)
213 ICT professionals 0.154* (0.010) 0.159* (0.014)
242 Business/statistical professionals 0.109* (0.009) 0.127* (0.014)
313 IT service delivery 0.198* (0.029) 0.188* (0.022)
352 Legal associate professionals 0.259* (0.012) 0.177* (0.046)
353 Business/ﬁnance ass. professionals 0.225* (0.026) 0.131* (0.011)
354 Sales associate professionals 0.103† (0.038) 0.163* (0.020)
412 Admin occupations: ﬁnance 0.054 (0.040) 0.124* (0.008)
413 Admin occupations: records 0.192† (0.071) 0.147* (0.013)
414 Admin occupations: comms 0.153† (0.060) 0.171* (0.046)
415 General admin 0.260* (0.076) 0.163* (0.010)
421 Secretarial 0.346* (0.081) 0.185* (0.014)
712 Sales related 0.278* (0.047) 0.194* (0.020)
721 Customer service 0.354† (0.131) 0.147* (0.015)
N 548,858 361,761
R2 0.416 0.250
Notes: NES sample of men and women age 16–65. Reported coefﬁcients are those
on an interaction term between working in the ﬁnance sector and the named occu-
pation. Other variables included are the same occupations (non-interacted), gender,
region, age and age squared. Year dummies are also included, the OLS clusters on
industry. Excluding the non-ﬁnance public sector. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level. †Signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
within-occupational premiums for most ﬁnance workers.9 However, for a stronger test,
not undertaken in previous literature, we restrict the sample to workers in those occupa-
tions that are most commonly found in both the ﬁnance and non-ﬁnance sectors, such as
Corporate Managers, Financial and Ofﬁce Managers, ICT professionals, Secretaries etc.10
We then interact occupation dummies for each occupation in turn, with the ﬁnance sector
indicator. The coefﬁcients on these interactions terms are reported in Table 3,11 and show
the ﬁnance sector annual pay premium within each occupation, i.e. the difference in wages
between workers in the same job but working in the ﬁnance or non-ﬁnance sectors. The
OLS results reveal a positive ﬁnance sector premium in every occupation, most of which
are statistically signiﬁcant. Of more interest are the ﬁxed effects results, where a further
restriction was imposed, that individuals had to be working in the same occupation in
9
These results are available from the authors on request.
10
Speciﬁcally, we include the 17 three-digit occupations for which at least 5% of workers doing that job are found
in the ﬁnance sector. The full list of these 17 occupations can be found in Table 3.
11
The non-interacted occupation dummies are also included in the estimated equation, but not reported in Table 3
for the sake of brevity.
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TABLE 4
Quantile regressions for the conditional ﬁnancial pay differential 1996–2011
Percentile: 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 99th
Finance 0.582* 0.492* 0.412* 0.348* 0.360* 0.601*
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
N 1,628,372 1,628,372 1,628,372 1,628,372 1,628,372 1,628,372
Notes: NESPD sample of men and women age 16–65. Other variables included are gender, region,
age and age squared. Year dummies are also included. Excluding the non-ﬁnance public sector.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered on industry. *Signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
successive periods.12 The coefﬁcients on the interactions therefore reﬂect the change in
wages earned by the same individual, working in the same occupation, but moving between
the ﬁnance and non-ﬁnance sector. The results reveal a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
ﬁnance sector premium in every occupation. These premiums are remarkably consistent
across occupations, mostly being clustered around a 20% premium, with the highest being
30% for Corporate Managers, and the lowest being 13% for ﬁnancial administrative occu-
pations. The occupations considered in Table 3 span the occupation hierarchy, and suggest
a pervasive ﬁnance sector pay premium. This is consistent with the idea of rent-sharing,
with economic rent generated within the ﬁnance sector shared between all workers.
So far we have only looked at the average pay differential in the ﬁnance sector
vis-a`-vis the rest of the private sector, which ignores potential distributional differences.
In quantile regression models the full (conditional) distribution of wages is expressed as a
function of the explanatory variables, including the ﬁnance sector indicator, rather than just
evaluating differences at the mean wage. The difference between ﬁnance and non-ﬁnance
sector wages can then be observed at each quantile of the wage distribution. Practically,
obtaining quantile regression coefﬁcients involves minimizing the weighted sum of the
absolute residuals, where the weights are determined by the quantile being considered.
Speciﬁcally, quantile regression chooses the  coefﬁcients to minimize the expression in
equation (3) below for any quantile, , we choose:
̂ =min
n∑
i=1
(Yi −Xii) (3)
where  is a check function for the th quantile, taking the value of  for positive residuals
and (−1) for negative residuals, hence ensuring positive values in all cases.13
Table 4 reports the results for quantile regressions estimated on a sample of all workers.
The positive ﬁnance pay premium is observed at all points of the wage distribution. The
premiums are observed to be large at the 10th percentile (79%), slightly lower in the
middle and then even higher at the 99th percentile (82%). These results differ at the lower
end from those presented by Bell and Van Reenen (2010). There are some differences
in speciﬁcation and sample between our analysis and theirs, and when we replicate their
12
The data set contains 2,276 observations involving a move into the ﬁnance sector but remaining in the same
occupation, and 2,140 observations involving a move out into the same occupation.
13
Hence the  terms provide the weights for the residuals, which will be asymmetric across positive and negative
residuals with the exception of where =0.5, i.e. the median quantile.
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analysis, we obtain exactly the same coefﬁcients in the quantile analysis.The key difference
between our analysis and theirs for explaining the difference in results turns out to be our
exclusion of the public sector. When attention is focussed on the private sector only, as
here, it seems that the ﬁnance workers at the lowest decile do better than other private
sector low-paid workers.
Estimating the quantilewage regression for a restricted sample of ﬁnance sectorworkers
only,14 there is a much larger gender pay differential at the 10th and the 99th percentile
compared to the rest of the distribution. The gaps between prime-aged relative to young
and old, and between London and the other regions, are all also at their largest at the 99th
percentile. It therefore seems that the very highest wages in the ﬁnance sector are going to
40–49 year old men working in London.
In summary, therefore, our analysis of the NESPD reveals a large and pervasive wage
premium to working in the ﬁnance sector which is larger when bonuses are included as a
measure of pay.While this is in part due to the unobserved characteristics of the individuals
who work in the ﬁnance sector, and in part due to the jobs being performed in that sector,
these factors alone cannot explain the wage premium in full, as a signiﬁcant premium
remains when we control for these factors using the panel element of the NESPD. We
suggest that this is consistent with the presence of rent-sharing in the ﬁnance sector. To
investigate further, in the following section we look for a link between sectoral rents and
pay. In subsequent sections we consider other potential explanations for the ﬁnance sector
wage premium.
III. Does the ﬁnancial sector share rents?
To look for evidence of rent-sharing in the ﬁnance sector, we ﬁrst investigate whether
excess rents exist in the sector. We then look for evidence to suggest that rents are more
likely to be shared in ﬁnance vis-a`-vis other sectors. We use two digit sector level data
from the EU KLEMS database, for the UK between 1996 and 2007.15 This provides a
panel of 59 industries observed over 12 years.16 Our main variable is log gross value added
per hour worked which is intended to capture rents, where value added is deﬁned as the
difference between the value of output in the sector and the value of material inputs, and
is consequently the sum of labour and capital compensation.17
Table 5 reports the results for the log of real value added per hourworked (in 2011 prices)
regressed on a ﬁnance sector dummy and year dummies (our base model). This indicates
whether rents (proxied using gross value added per hour) exist in the ﬁnance sector, over and
above the average across all other sectors. In the ﬁrst column, the coefﬁcient on the ﬁnance
sector variable is positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant. However, the speciﬁcation in the
14
See Supplementary Table S2.
15
Information is provided for consistently-deﬁned sectors in the EU KLEMS database up to 2007, hence the end
date for the analysis in this section.
16
Within ﬁnance, there are three two-digit sectors, namely 65 ‘Financial intermediation’, 66 ‘Insurance and pension
funding’, and 67 ‘Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial intermediation’. Note that there are a small number ofmissing values
for the very small sectors, hence why the sample size is Table 5 is 689 rather than (59 × 12=) 708.
17
Output within a sector is deﬁned as the weighted sum of products/services provided, with the weights given by
the share of the product in the total nominal value of the sector’s output. A similar method for calculating the value
of a sector’s input materials is used. For further information about EU KLEMS, see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
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TABLE 5
Sectoral variation in log (real value added per hour), 1996–2007
Disaggregating
Base model by sub sector
Finance 0.134 (0.132)
65. Financial intermediation 2.022* (0.060)
66. Insurance and pension funding 1.408* (0.060)
67. Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial
intermediation
1.252* (0.060)
Sector dummies No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
N 689 689
R2 0.008 0.967
Notes: Dependent variable is log (real value added per hour) at the (2-digit)
sector level, regressed against a ﬁnance dummyand a full set of year dummies
in column 1, and against a full set of time and sector dummies in column
2 (the omitted sector in column 2 is sector 93 ‘other service activities’).
Standard errors are in parentheses. *Signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
second column disaggregates the ﬁnance sector into its three composite sub sectors, as well
as including two-digit sector dummies. For brevity only the coefﬁcients for the three ﬁnance
sub sectors are presented. The omitted category here is ‘other service activities’, which has
virtually zero value added so that all the coefﬁcients in this speciﬁcation are positive. All
three ﬁnance sub sectors enjoy relatively larger rents than those in ‘other service activities’.
The largest ﬁnance sector premium is for ‘ﬁnancial intermediation’ (655% higher) and
although this is not the largest over all industries, it is the ninth largest in terms of average
rents observed over the period. The eight sectors with larger observed value added are all
related to petroleum, other energy, tobacco or real estate, which are also likely to be sectors
that generate their own excess rents, for various reasons.18 In addition, further analysis
not reported in Table 5 interacted the three ﬁnance sub-sector dummies with the time
variable. Positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on these interaction terms were
observed for sector 65 ‘Financial intermediation’ (interaction coefﬁcient (standard error)
0.062 (0.012)), and 67 ‘Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial intermediation’ (0.021 (0.012)).
Thus rents are both high in these three ﬁnance sub-sectors, and rising over time in two of
the sub-sectors, so that rent-sharing offers a potential explanation for both the high ﬁnance
premium and its increase over time.
To investigate whether ﬁnance sector rents are more likely to be shared amongst ﬁnance
sector workers, we revert back to our NESPDworker level wage equations (1) and (2) from
the previous section, additionally controlling for industry-level valued added per hour,
clustering the standard errors on two-digit industry. The effect of the addition of value
added to the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation is to reduce the ﬁnance pay premium by around
18
Speciﬁcally, the sectors with higher value added are industry SIC codes SIC 11 (Extraction of crude petroleum
& natural gas), 16 (Manufacture of tobacco products), 23 (Manufacture of coke, reﬁned petroleum products), 37
(Recycling), 40 (Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply), 41 (Collection, puriﬁcation and distribution of water),
61 (Water Transport), 70 (Real Estate activities).
© 2017 The Authors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics published by Oxford University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Finance sector wage premiums 11
one quarter,19 thus suggesting that a signiﬁcant portion of the ﬁnance sector pay premium
is related to rents. Disaggregating the ﬁnance sector by sub sector, all of the ﬁnance sub-
sector pay premiums fall, to a greater or lesser extent, with the inclusion of the value-added
variable.20
Additional speciﬁcations further included interaction terms between log value added
per hour and the ﬁnance sub-sector dummies, in order to estimate the elasticities of pay
with respect to value added per hour in each ﬁnance sub-sector, over and above the av-
erage estimated elasticity of 0.15 in the non-ﬁnance sector.21 The fund management and
security broking sub-sectors demonstrate the largest positive interaction coefﬁcients, with
elasticities 0.81 and 0.48 larger than the non-ﬁnance elasticity, respectively.22 A 1% rise in
value added in ﬁnance is therefore associated with a signiﬁcantly larger increase in wages
than a 1% rise in value added in most other sectors.
Overall, this section therefore provides evidence consistent with the existence of proﬁt-
sharing in the ﬁnancial sector, at least for the highly paid ﬁnance jobs commonly associated
with ‘the City’. We have shown that value added in ﬁnance is higher than in most other
sectors, that it has increased more than in most other sectors, and that it is more strongly
correlated with wages in ﬁnance than in most other sectors. These facts are all consistent
with rent-sharing being the cause of the high and risingwage premium in the ﬁnance sector.
They cannot be claimed as proof of a causal effect of value added on wages, however. It
is the case that the correlation is estimated in the presence of sector ﬁxed effects, and
so is identiﬁed off variation in value added over time within sectors. It is not therefore
due to unobserved characteristics of sectors that are correlated with both value added and
wages and which are constant over time. It cannot be completely ruled out, however, that
other factors may have changed in the ﬁnance sector at the same time as the rise in value
added, and it is those other factors that have actually increased the wage. In the following
sections we therefore consider alternative possible explanations for the high and rising
ﬁnance sector pay premium, including relatively higher levels of human capital and task
biased technological change.
IV. Is the ﬁnance sector more skill intensive?
Higherwages in theﬁnance sector could potentially be explained bybetter qualiﬁedworkers
in the ﬁnance sector relative to all other industries, and rising wage premiums explained
19
SeeSupplementaryTableS3 for results.Column1 is the standardOLSequation, and column2 is the standardﬁxed
effects speciﬁcation. Adding the industry value-added variable (column 3) reduces the estimated ﬁnance coefﬁcient
from 0.263 to 0.194.
20
Compare columns 4 and 5 of Supplementary Table S3.
21
See column 6 of Supplementary Table S3.
22
As an alternative test, we collapsed the income, age and region data in NESPD down to the two-digit sector
level, so that it was at the same level of aggregation as the value-added data. A similar speciﬁcation to column 6
in Supplementary Table S3 was then estimated, with the log of value added per hour interacted with all 59 two-
digit sector dummies. The coefﬁcients for two of the ﬁnance sector interactions with value added (65 ‘Financial
intermediation’ and 67 ‘Activities auxiliary to ﬁnancial intermediation’) were positive and statistically signiﬁcant,
with the latter particularly large at 1.62, the fourth largest of all the interaction coefﬁcients (results available from
authors on request). Note that sub-sector 67 is the one that contains fund management and security broking, the two
sub-sectorswith the largest interactions in themore disaggregated individual level analysis in SupplementaryTable S3.
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by increasingly well-qualiﬁed workers, although these explanations seem unlikely given
that we have found a signiﬁcant premium across the whole distribution. It has been well
documented that the total employment shares of graduates have increased in the labour
market as a whole. For example Lindley andMachin (2012) using the Labour Force Survey
(LFS) show that the employment share of graduates increased from 0.14 in 1996 to 0.23 in
2006 and to 0.31 in 2011.Wewould like to knowhowmany of these graduates are employed
in ﬁnance and, conditional on the overall increase in the supply of graduates, whether the
number working in ﬁnance is rising. In doing so, we must of course acknowledge that the
skills of graduates may change over time, and this effect may differ by subject, as Higher
Education has expanded to include a wider spectrum of young people.23 Thus any increase
in the number of graduates over time may overstate the increase in skills to a sector.
Data from the LFS show that the ﬁnance employment share amongst graduates has
increased from 0.046 in 1994 to 0.060 in 2008, but then fell slightly to 0.058 in 2011.
So before the start of the recession in 2008, there were relatively more ﬁnance workers
amongst graduates than amongst the total private sector workforce (the proportion of all
private sector workers employed in ﬁnance was 0.052 in 2008). Disaggregation by sub-
ject area24 shows that the ﬁnance employment share is much larger for economics gradu-
ates,maths/computing graduates andmanagement/business graduates,with the economists
demonstrating the largest increases.25 In 2011 over a quarter of all economics gradu-
ates were employed in the ﬁnancial sector. Figures for maths/computing and manage-
ment/business were 10% and almost 11% respectively. Given these subjects are by nature
more numerical, this also suggests that in the long term there has been numerical skill
upgrading (mainly from economics graduates) in the ﬁnancial sector.
Given that we ﬁnd some evidence of skill upgrading in the ﬁnance sector, which may
therefore provide the explanation for the high and rising wage premium in that sector, we
augment equations (1) and (2) with measures for highest qualiﬁcations using the 1997–
2008/9 British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS is a longitudinal data set that
contains questions on highest qualiﬁcations as well as a measure of annual labour income,
including bonuses, which was ﬁrst asked in 1997.26 Consequently we estimate
Yit =+kFkit +Xit+ t + "it , (4)
Yit =+kFkit +Xit+ t +i + "it , (5)
23
See Lindley and McIntosh (2015) for a discussion of such issues.
24
See Supplementary Figure S1.
25
The subject of degree question for much of this period in the LFS refers only to the undergraduate degree, with
subject of postgraduate qualiﬁcations only added more recently. We therefore focus only on subject of ﬁrst degrees
here. For detailed deﬁnitions of the subjects listed in Figure 2 see Lindley and McIntosh (2015).
26
The BHPS is a sample of over 5,000 households in the UK, conducted annually since 1991 and contains
information on human capital and socio-economic characteristics of each individual in the household. From 1997
onwards the survey also collected information on annual labour income and bonuses. The data on annual earnings in
the BHPS is constructed from monthly and weekly earnings rather than being directly asked. From 1997 there was
a separate question asked regarding the value of all bonuses received in the last 12 months. Following Bell and Van
Reenen (2010), we add this value to the respondent’s annual labour income to produce total annual labour income
including bonuses.
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TABLE 6
Estimate of the log annual labour income ﬁnance pay differential,
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 1997–2008
OLS Fixed effects
Finance 0.393* (0.093) 0.127* (0.022)
Finance×Graduates 0.564* (0.084) 0.172* (0.047)
Finance×SMC 0.575* (0.085) 0.125* (0.049)
Finance× 2 Plus A levels 0.290* (0.094) 0.120* (0.045)
Finance×Other Q 0.242† (0.104) 0.097* (0.038)
N 52,85 52,85 52,85 52,85
R2 0.287 0.289 0.110 0.111
Notes: BHPS sample of men and women age 16–65.Wage equations for log annual income. conditioning
on gender, married, region, age and age squared. Year dummies are also included. Excluding the non-
ﬁnance public sector. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered on industry. *Signiﬁcant at the 1%
signiﬁcance level. †Signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
whereFk is a dummy that is equal to one ifworker i is employed in theﬁnance sector, and has
highest qualiﬁcation k at time t, and zero otherwise.27 There are four highest qualiﬁcation
groups; graduates, some college, 2 plus A-levels28 and other/no qualiﬁcations. Again our
controls in vector X are region of residence, gender, age and age squared, but we also now
condition on marital status. Equation (5) differs to equation (4) only in that it also includes
worker level dummies and thus provides ﬁxed effects estimates.
The estimates of  from equations (1) and (2) are provided in the ﬁrst and third columns
of Table 6, whilst the second column provides the estimates of the  coefﬁcients from
equation (4) and the ﬁxed effects estimates of the  coefﬁcients from equation (5) are
presented in the ﬁnal column. The OLS conditional log annual wage differential over the
period is 48%, while the second column shows that this is 76% for graduates and 78%
for individuals with some college. The ﬁnal two columns provide the FE estimates. These
suggest a similar sized ﬁnancial labour income differential within each education group.
Conditioning on unobserved heterogeneity, the ﬁnance premiums are lower than the OLS
estimates for all education groups, which is suggestive of unobserved wage-enhancing
characteristics, such as greater cognitive ability. However, we cannot say how much of the
unobserved heterogeneity observed here is a consequence of cognitive skill differences, to
which we now turn.
In summary, the data suggest that the ﬁnance sector does employ an above-average
proportion of higher-qualiﬁed workers, with some evidence that the sector is increasingly
attracting the more numerate graduates. Qualiﬁcation levels, as an indicator of skills, are
therefore a potential explanation of the high and rising ﬁnance sector wage premium. The
27
We interact working in ﬁnance with the highest qualiﬁcation in this way, because highest qualiﬁcation does
not vary with time for the vast majority of our subjects, and so would be picked up by the individual ﬁxed effects
in equation (5) if entered on their own. Equation (4) is then speciﬁed in the same way for comparison purposes.
If instead we add the highest qualiﬁcation variables to an OLS speciﬁcation as in equation (1), then the estimated
ﬁnance coefﬁcient falls from the 0.393 reported inTable 6 column 1, to 0.308, revealing that part of the ﬁnance sector
wage premium is due to differing stocks of qualiﬁcations between the ﬁnance and non-ﬁnance sectors, but that a
signiﬁcant premium remains even after controlling for qualiﬁcation differences.
28
A levels are national qualiﬁcations obtained at the end of upper secondary schooling.
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regression results, however, show that although qualiﬁcations go some way to explaining
the size of the ﬁnance sector wage advantage, a signiﬁcant premium remains, which is
similar in size within each education group. This result compares with the analysis of
Philippon and Reshef (2012) who similarly ﬁnd an increasing skill-intensity in the ﬁnance
sector at the same time as the increase in relative wages, but that the former cannot fully
explain the latter, given an increase in the ﬁnance sector relative wage post-1990 that is
greater than that predicted by the increase in skill-intensity.
V. Do ﬁnance sector workers have higher cognitive skills?
In this section we look further into the characteristics considered as unobserved in the pre-
vious section, and investigate to what extent the ﬁnance premium might be a consequence
of high and rising cognitive skills amongst ﬁnance workers, paying particular attention to
differences in numeracy and reading skills.We start by looking at whether ﬁnance workers
have better skills on average and whether any such gap is increasing.
We draw upon the British cohort study (BCS)which is a sample ofmen andwomen born
in 1970 and the national child development study (NCDS) where respondents were born in
1958. The most recent sweeps of the BCS and NCDS were undertaken in 2008, when the
BCS (NCDS) respondents were aged 38 (50) and questionswere asked about various socio-
economic and work characteristics of the respondents. The surveys provide information
on gross pay, highest educational qualiﬁcation, industry of employment, marital status,
gender and region of residence.
Differences in childhood test scores
Given that ﬁnance workers could be more numerate as adults because their job involves
more numerical tasks, we use childhood test scores for mathematics and reading taken
when the respondents were aged 10 and 11, rather than adult test scores. The BCS 1980
and NCDS 1969 follow-ups provide reading and mathematics tests when the respondents
were aged 10/11, so in addition to being pre-employment, they are also uninﬂuenced by
secondary and higher education.All test scores were standardised to have mean zero and a
standard deviation of one, to make them comparable across surveys.We therefore interpret
any differences in results between data sets as cohort effects, rather than age or time effects,
since both are observed at the same age, and any general increases over time are removed
by the standardization to a zero mean in both data sets. Comparison of the ﬁnance skill
differential between data sets therefore indicates whether the younger cohort of ﬁnance
workers are relatively more skilled than the older cohort. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst time that the relative cognitive skills of ﬁnance workers have been analysed
in this way.
To quantify the relationship between childhood cognitive skills and subsequent ﬁnance
sector employment we estimate the following equations
TSRit=age10 =R +RFit=2004 + "it=age10 (6)
TSMit=age10 =M +MFit=2004 + "it=age10 (7)
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TABLE 7
NCDS and BCS: OLS estimates of the ﬁnance differential for standardized childhood test scores
NCDS NCDS BCS BCS
standardized maths standardized standardized maths standardized
test (age 11) reading test test (age 10) reading test
(age 11) (age 10)
Finance 0.402* 0.235* 0.391* 0.419*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.052)
Finance×Graduates 1.195* 0.839* 1.021* 0.909*
(0.183) (0.183) (0.127) (0.128)
Finance×SMC 0.725* 0.420* 0.436* 0.470*
(0.141) (0.141) (0.115) (0.116)
Finance×A levels 0.639* 0.442* 0.756* 0.728*
(0.124) (0.124) (0.137) (0.137)
Finance×Other Q 0.090 0.005 0.089 0.172†
(0.076) (0.076) (0.071) (0.071)
N 6,790 6,790 6,790 6,790 5,968 5,968 5,968 5,968
R2 0.008 0.014 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.020 0.016 0.022
Notes:Table shows results fromOLS regressions of the indicated childhood test score against, in consecutive columns,
a ﬁnance sector dummy variable, and the ﬁnance dummy interacted with indicators of highest qualiﬁcation. NCDS
sample of men and women born in 1958 and observed in 2004 (age 46). BCS sample of men and women born in
1970 and observed in 2004 (age 34). Conditioning on gender. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Signiﬁcant at the
1% signiﬁcance level. †Signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level. BCS coefﬁcients in bold are statistically signiﬁcantly
different from their NCDS equivalents. BCS, British cohort study; NCDS, national child development study.
TSRit=age10 =′R +
∑
kRF
k
it=2004 + "it=age10 (8)
TSMit=age10 =′M +
∑
kMF
k
it=2004 + "it=age10 (9)
where the TSj(j=R,M ) dependent variables are reading and mathematics test scores ob-
served at age 10 (1969 for the NCDS and 1980 for the BCS) and F is a ﬁnance dummy
observed in 2004 for the NCDS and the BCS (when workers are age 46 and 34 respec-
tively). In equations (8) and (9) the ﬁnance dummy is allowed to vary by four highest
qualiﬁcation groups as deﬁned in the previous section. All equations in this section also
control for gender.
Table 7 shows that the average childhood maths scores are 0.40 standard deviations
higher for those who go on to work in ﬁnance in the NCDS than for those who do not,
which is very similar, and insigniﬁcantly different, to the differential in the BCS for 34
year olds (0.39).29 For reading test scores, the ﬁnance differential in the NCDS is lower
(0.24 standard deviations) relative to that for the BCS (0.42). This difference is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level (t=2.38). Lookingwithin education groups, none of the ﬁnance-
non-ﬁnance skill premia are signiﬁcantly different in the BCS compared to those in the
NCDS, though close to signiﬁcance we observed lower relative maths skills of ﬁnance
workers amongst those with some college education in the more recent BCS cohort, and
29
We cannot compare the BCS age 34 in 2004 with the NCDS age 33 in 1991 because current industry of
employment is not included in the NCDS 1991 survey.
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higher relative reading skills amongst the A level and other lower qualiﬁcation groups in
the BCS.Although ﬁnance workers have higher cognitive ability than non-ﬁnance workers,
on average, there is therefore no evidence that they are becoming relatively more numerate
amongst more recent cohorts, and any evidence for improving relative reading skills is
restricted to less well educated groups. Therefore even if cognitive skills do have some role
to play in explaining the higher wages of ﬁnance workers, they cannot explain the rising
wage premium.
Wage equations
In this sub-section, we estimate wage equations with NCDS and BCS data, to determine
the extent to which inter-sectoral differences in cognitive skills can explain the ﬁnance
sector wage premium. We pool the two data sets, to increase sample size, and use data
from the 2004 and 2008 sweeps, to provide a longitudinal element.30 Our sample consists
of 15,642 individuals of whom 969 (6.1%) are employed in ﬁnance.31
In the BCS and NCDS respondents are asked ‘the last time you were paid, what was
your gross pay before deductions?’. Unfortunately neither survey includes information on
annual labour income or bonuses, so we are faced with the familiar problem of potentially
under-estimating the true ﬁnance premium, by using data on monthly pay.32 We control for
gender, marital status, region of residence, age and year.
The results are shown in Table 8. The ﬁrst 4 columns replicate the analysis with the
BHPS in Table 6, estimating equations (1) and (2) (columns 1 and 3), and equations (4)
and (5) (columns 2 and 4), showing the effects of controlling for highest qualiﬁcation. The
results in Table 8 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6.
The additional analysis in Table 8 comes in the ﬁnal two columns, where we also
condition on childhood test scores. As with the qualiﬁcation variables, test scores are also
entered into the equation via interactions with the ﬁnance sector variable, otherwise they
would be removed in the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation, since the childhood test scores do not
change with age as an adult.33 We interpret the coefﬁcients on the interaction terms as
ﬁnance-speciﬁc returns to maths and reading, though acknowledge that selection effects
may mean that these are actually the returns to maths and reading for the factors correlated
with the decision to enter ﬁnance. Our preferred speciﬁcation, the ﬁxed effects results
controlling for other unobserved heterogeneity, shows that the return to cognitive skills is
only marginally signiﬁcantly different in ﬁnance in the case of maths skills, and actually
shows a lower return to such skills in the ﬁnance sector. Presumably, those with goodmaths
30
We do not use the BCS 1996 sweep in our panel analysis since the gross pay variable is measured differently,
whereas it is identical in the 2004 and 2008 follow-ups. We also considered using the NCDS for comparable age
changes, using sweep 5 (age 33 in 1991) and sweep 6 (age 41 in 1999) but as already mentioned, industry of
employment is not included in the 1991 data.
31
The number of individuals is 9,345 and these are observed on average 1.7 times.
32
The ﬁeldwork for the 2004 BCS was undertaken between February 2004 and June 2005. There is a question on
annual employment income in the 2008 BCS but this is banded and does not appear in the 2004 sweep. Given we
estimate panel data models using the 2004 and 2008 BCS/NCDS we do not use this annual employment income data.
33
If we enter the childhood test scores directly into the OLS equation in column 1, then the ﬁnance sector wage
premium is reduced, but only from 0.293 to 0.224. Thus, cognitive ability explains at most a small part of the ﬁnance
sector premium.
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TABLE 8
BCS and NCDS: estimates of the ﬁnance monthly gross pay differential in 2004 & 2008
Conditioning also on child
Base model test scores
Pooled OLS Fixed effects Pooled OLS Fixed effects
Finance 0.293* 0.113†
(0.024) (0.048)
Finance×Graduates 0.753* 0.270* 0.685* 0.461†
(0.064) (0.019) (0.096) (0.195)
Finance×SMC 0.487* 0.034 0.432* 0.169
(0.055) (0.107) (0.082) (0.156)
Finance×A levels 0.254* 0.230‡ 0.202† 0.342‡
(0.055) (0.133) (0.081) (0.177)
Finance×Other Q 0.124* 0.061 0.083 0.158
(0.032) (0.069) (0.061) (0.125)
Finance×Maths score 0.004 −0.011‡
(0.003) (0.006)
Finance×Reading score −0.003 0.010
(0.004) (0.008)
N 15,642 15,642 15,642 15,642 15,642 15,642
R2 0.231 0.235 0.005 0.005 0.235 0.005
Notes: Dependent variable is monthly wage. BCS (NCDS) sample of men and women born in 1970 (1958) observed
in 2004 and 2008. Conditioning on marital status, region of residence and year. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level. †Signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level. ‡Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
BCS, British cohort study; NCDS, national child development study.
skills have a better non-ﬁnance option and so a lower return to securing a job in the ﬁnance
sector. There is therefore no case for higher maths ability being the source of the ﬁnance
sector wage advantage.
VI. Technological change and task inputs
Theﬁnal possibility thatwe consider is that theﬁnance paypremiumcould be a consequence
of workers having different job characteristics, as well as different personal characteristics.
In this section we consider whether the ﬁnance sector has become more intensive in non-
routine task inputs and computer use, as well as looking to see whether these factors can
partially explain the ﬁnancial pay differential.TheGBSkills Survey (GBSS) provides usual
information on the wages, human capital and socio-economic characteristics of workers,
and also includes measures of computer use and job task inputs. The GBSS are cross
sectional data available over a number of years, although the task input data are only
collected since 1997. Consequently we use data from the 1997, 2001, 2006 and 2012 cross
sections providing a sample of 8,294 respondents overall. Of these 8,294 workers, 1,857
(22%) are employed in ﬁnance. Again our sample is for workers aged between 16 and 65
and excludes the non-ﬁnance public sector. Gross hourly earnings are deﬂated into constant
prices, using the RPI, though note these will exclude annually paid bonuses.
We consider the task input measures that arguably capture non-routine tasks (see Green,
2012). These are numeracy, literacy, problem-solving and inﬂuencing people.We also use
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TABLE 9
Hourly wages, non-routine task inputs and computer use complexity, 1997 and 2012
Non-ﬁnance Finance
Difference
1997 2012 2012 − 1997 2012 2012 − in the
1997 1997 difference
Hourly pay 6.561 6.966 0.405† 9.134 11.27 2.138† 1.732*
(0.173) (0.872) (0.568)
Numeracy 1.847 1.897 0.062 2.117 2.170 −0.024 −0.086
(0.056) (0.113) (0.121)
Literacy 2.175 2.323 0.148* 2.746 2.705 −0.041 −0.189‡
(0.047) (0.087) (0.101)
Problem solving 2.697 2.751 0.054 2.892 2.810 −0.082 −0.135
(0.043) (0.084) (0.092)
Inﬂuencing 1.954 2.165 0.210* 2.197 2.241 0.044 −0.166‡
(0.040) (0.076) (0.085)
Computer complexity 1.224 1.496 0.271* 2.004 2.179 0.177‡ −0.095
(0.049) (0.097) (0.106)
N 1,102 1,061 264 356
Notes: GB Skills Survey sample of men and women observed in 1997, 2001, 2006 and 2012. All estimates are
weighted using person weights. *Signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level. †Signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
‡Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
‘computer use complexity’ to measure technological input. The task input measures are
derived from a range of questions asking respondents how important a certain skill is in
their job, with respondents’options ‘not important’, ‘not very important’, ‘fairly important’,
‘very important’ and ‘essential’, ranging between 1 and 5. These various aspects of skill
use are collapsed into ﬁve groups based on explanatory factor analysis.34
Table 9 shows that hourly pay, non-routine task inputs and computer use are generally
higher in the ﬁnance relative to the non-ﬁnance sector. In terms of changes over time, the
ﬁrst row shows that the average hourly pay rate has increased in non-ﬁnance to 6.97 pounds
per hour in 2012 and in ﬁnance to 11.27 pounds in 2012 and the ﬁnal column shows that
this increase in hourly pay is statistically larger in the ﬁnance sector relative to non-ﬁnance
(by 1.73 pounds). However, although workers in the ﬁnance sector generally demonstrate
higher non-routine task inputs and computer complexity vis-a`-vis non-ﬁnance, if anything
this gap is closing rather than widening (certainly in terms of literacy and inﬂuencing
people). This therefore fails to support the idea thatTBTCmight be explaining the increase
in the ﬁnancial pay differential through changes in the relative quantities of non-routine
tasks being performed.
Estimating an OLS ﬁnancial log hourly pay differential, using the 1997, 2001, 2006 and
2012 cross sectional GBSS data (equation (1)),35 we ﬁnd a raw differential of 37%, which
falls slightly to 36% once we condition on gender, marital status and region of residence.
Allowing the ﬁnancial pay differential to vary across highest national qualiﬁcation frame-
34
See Supplementary Table S4 for details, and Green (2012) for a detailed discussion on the construction of these
non-routine task measures.
35
See Supplementary Table S5.
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work (NQF) level (and thus estimating equation (4)) again shows that the ﬁnancial pay
differential is largest for NQF level 4 which contains graduates (72%) and is negative for
those with no qualiﬁcations (−21%). Conditioning further on non-routine task inputs and
computer use complexity reduces these ﬁnance pay differentials, but they remain signiﬁcant
for graduates (40%), NQF level three workers (15%) and workers with no qualiﬁcations
(−9%). So in terms of the increasing prices (wages) attached to non-routine tasks (which
are presumably in higher demand through TBTC), there is little evidence that differences
in non-routine task endowments can fully explain the existing ﬁnance pay premium.
In summary, we ﬁnd no evidence that the higher levels of non-routine task inputs and
computer use complexity observed in the ﬁnance sector can fully explain the ﬁnance pay
premium, nor its increase. Conditioning on non-routine tasks and computer use reduces
the differential but a signiﬁcant premium remains, and exists for graduates and workers
with NQF level three qualiﬁcations.
We can perform similar analyses, examining the ﬁnance sector pay premium control-
ling for qualiﬁcations and job tasks, as well as for adult tests of cognitive ability, across a
wide range of 22 OECD countries, using the OECD 2012 Programme for the International
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) data.36 Speciﬁcally, that data set contains
information on monthly wages that contain bonuses, as well as test scores for numeracy,
literacy and problem solving, along with information on non-routine task inputs for nu-
meracy, reading, writing, inﬂuencing people and computer use complexity. The test scores
capture adult cognitive skills rather than childhood skills, but the task input variables are
very similar to those used in the GBSS above.
The PIACC data reveal that, in almost all countries, workers in the ﬁnance sector have
higher adult test scores both for numeracy and literacy, perform more non-routine tasks
in their job, and use computers to a greater level of complexity. We therefore estimate
the ﬁnancial sector pay differential, conditioning on these competencies. The PIAAC data
are cross sectional observed only in 2012 so our estimating equations are again based
on augmented versions of equations (1) and (4), estimated separately by country. Most
of these countries have monthly wage data that include bonuses, but for ﬁve countries
(Austria, Canada, Germany, Sweden and the US) the wage data are banded so that we
are only provided with the decile to which each respondent’s wage corresponds. For these
countries we therefore perform interval regression, which is a generalization of the Tobit
model but with variable cut-off points.37
The results reveal38 that the raw ﬁnance wage differential is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant for most countries we observe (except for Japan, Russia and the Slovak Re-
public). The largest raw ﬁnancial pay differential is 84% for Spain, closely followed by
70% for the UK which is close to that of 77% found earlier, using the NES for 2009–11
(Table 2).
The ﬁnancial pay differential falls in most countries after conditioning on gender and
age, including in theUK, Spain and theUS. Further conditioning sequentially on test scores
and non-routine task inputs reduces the ﬁnancial pay differential still further. However, a
36
See http://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/ for details.
37
See Amemiya (1973) as well as Stewart (1983).
38
See Supplementary Table S6.
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signiﬁcant differential remains for 17 of the 22 countries observed. The largest is still in
Spain (49%), the second largest is in Germany (44%) and the third largest is in the UK
(41%). This provides further evidence of ﬁnance pay premiums which cannot be explained
by human capital or task variables, which are largest in Spain and the UK but which are
prevalent in almost 80% of OECD countries.
VII. Conclusion
The UK ﬁnance sector wage premium is large and has increased over time. The largest
ﬁnance sector returns go to male graduates, living in London, aged between 40 and
49 who are employed as dealers or brokers in the security broking sector. However,
the premium is observed for different sub-sectors of ﬁnance, for different occupations,
for workers with different qualiﬁcation levels and also across most other OECD coun-
tries. Moreover, it can be found at all points of the pay distribution, not just at the
mean. It therefore seems to be a pervasive feature of remuneration in the ﬁnancial
sector.
This paper has added to the literature about the ﬁnance sector wage premium in a
number of ways. First, the descriptive statistics about the premium, as described in the
previous paragraph, are more extensive than has previously been the case. In particular,
studying the premium within occupation (while still controlling for unobserved worker
heterogeneity with worker ﬁxed effects) provides new evidence on the pervasiveness of
the premium across occupations within ﬁnance. Second, we have provided new evidence
on a possible rent-sharing explanation of the premium, estimating the elasticities of wages
with respect to sector-level value added, and third we have also considered, and ruled
out, a wider range of alternative explanations for the ﬁnance sector wage premium than is
commonly the case.
None of the possible explanations for the ﬁnance sector pay premium, involving the
characteristics of the workers in the ﬁnance sector, or aspects of the jobs that they do, can
fully explain why ﬁnance sector workers are paid more than non-ﬁnance sector workers,
or why the same worker moving between the two sectors sees his/her pay rise or fall
accordingly (depending on direction of movement) even when doing the same job in both
sectors.We therefore propose that the ﬁnance sector pay premium is, at least in part, due to
the rent-sharing of that sector’s proﬁts. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the pay
premium is prevalent across jobs at all points of the occupation hierarchy, for workers of
all skill types, and at all points of the wage distribution. Furthermore, wages for a number
of groups of ﬁnance workers are positively related to the value added produced in their
sector, suggesting a sharing of rents produced in those sectors. This is the case for workers
in the central bank, building societies, security brokers, activities auxiliary to ﬁnance, and
most strongly for those working in fund management, for whom the elasticity of wages
with respect to sectoral value added is approaching unity.
The ﬁnal question to be answered is whether policy makers should be concerned. These
are private sector workers (with the exception of the employees of ﬁnancial institutions
nationalized in the recent crisis), and it could be argued that whatever ﬁrms choose to pay
these workers, particularly when it is a share of a generated surplus, is of no concern to
public policy. However, there is the possibility that the large rewards in the ﬁnance sector
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could lead to an inefﬁcient allocation of labour at the national level. We saw in Section
IV that the ﬁnance sector is increasingly attracting graduates from the more numerate
disciplines. The question for further research therefore becomes whether the ﬁnance sector
is the optimal place for the most technically proﬁcient workers to add the most social
value.
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Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article:
Figure S1. Share of graduates working in the ﬁnance sector, by degree subject.
Table S1. Changes over time: Fixed effects estimates of the log annual gross pay ﬁnance
differential 1996–2011.
Table S2. Quantile pay regressions for ﬁnance sector workers 1996–2011.
Table S3. Finance pay differential: NES panel 1996–2007: log real annual earnings.
Table S4. The composition of the speciﬁc task measures from the SES.
Table S5. OLS estimates of the ﬁnance hourly pay differential 1997–2012.
Table S6. Cross country ﬁnance sector log monthly pay differentials (including bonuses)
for 2012.
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